{"id":15366,"date":"2023-04-20T09:26:30","date_gmt":"2023-04-20T07:26:30","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/dfcme.me\/?p=15366"},"modified":"2023-04-20T09:26:31","modified_gmt":"2023-04-20T07:26:31","slug":"elections-under-the-loupe-a-brief-overview-of-the-presidential-elections","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/dfc.me\/en\/elections-under-the-loupe-a-brief-overview-of-the-presidential-elections\/","title":{"rendered":"Elections under the Loupe: A brief overview of the presidential elections"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

The second round of the presidential election, which was held for the first time in the last 20 years, resulted in the victory of one of the leaders of the Europe Now Movement and former Minister of Economy, Jakov Milatovi\u0107, over the long-term president of Montenegro and leader of the Democratic Party of Socialists, Milo \u0110ukanovi\u0107. According to the State Election Commission data<\/a>, based on 100 percent of the sample, Milatovi\u0107 won 58.88 percent of the votes and \u0110ukanovi\u0107 41.12 percent.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The two candidates’ campaigns were conducted in the spirit of strong polarization in society with primary messages related to economic prosperity and an increase in citizens’ standard of living, which will be ensured by accelerated entry into the EU. Although mostly peaceful, the two candidates’ performances contained elements of a negative campaign and were aimed at discrediting their opponents, especially during the TV duel. Negative campaigns against both candidates via social networks and mobile communication applications were also noticed<\/a>. Also, in anticipation of the second round, a paid negative video campaign directed against Jakov Milatovi\u0107 appeared on YouTube.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The elections have shown that Montenegro, in addition to dysfunctional institutions, a disorganized voters list, and an electoral, and legislative framework that has been the subject of numerous criticisms, must find a way to cope with media and political influence outside its borders. Since August 2020, Montenegrin society has been constantly engaged in election cycles and campaigns, which, along with the upcoming extraordinary June parliamentary election and the potential implementation of the census at the end of the year, further paves the way for foreign actors to influence the socio-political processes in the country.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

As in the previous period, the elections in Montenegro were closely monitored in the region. Political actors, media, and activists from Serbia monitored, commented, and participated in the election process. The majority unequivocally lined up on the side of Andrija Mandi\u0107, and then in the second round Jakov Milatovi\u0107. The support that Milatovi\u0107 received from these structures was mainly based on their pretensions for \u0110ukanovi\u0107 to be defeated since the newly elected president was criticized after April 2 from the same addresses that formally supported him during the campaign. Particularly prominent in this support were far-right structures, while media support from Belgrade was also manifested through disinformation and sensationalist narratives that mostly targeted \u0110ukanovi\u0107 and individuals close to him. On the other hand, continued support for \u0110ukanovi\u0107 by certain regional political and media actors, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Croatia, and Serbia, with narratives about the need to preserve Montenegrin independence and statehood was noticeable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Although it can be stated that this time there was no campaign of the intensity of the Battle for Nik\u0161i\u0107 <\/em>campaign, it should be borne in mind that after August 30, pro-Serbian and pro-Russian structures in Montenegro have been installed in the depth<\/em> of state institutions, which enables the realization of the interests of external actors who are in permanent conflict with foreign policy commitments and the value system on which Montenegro rests.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Apart from the parties, candidates, the media, and part of the public, the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) also got directly involved in the campaign. The fact that the political activity of the SOC is not a thing of the past was shown by the blessing<\/a><\/em> of Metropolitan Joanikije for the implementation of the parliamentary elections, which at that moment had not yet been announced, as well as the direct interference in the campaign for the presidential elections. During both election rounds, the SOC had its own political preferences, participated in the promotional activities of certain candidates, and publicly suggested to citizens who they should vote for, that is, who is the undesirable candidate<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Shortly before the second round, the Serbian Orthodox Church called on believers and people of goodwill<\/em> to go to the polls and stated that the candidate Milo \u0110ukanovi\u0107 was leading an anti-Church campaign. The SOC supported one political party and criticized the other, which led to inequality in the media space and possible influence on the electoral process<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Metropolitan Joanikije Mi\u0107ovi\u0107 announced at the very beginning of the campaign that it was time for \u0110ukanovi\u0107 to leave. The second representative of the SOC in Montenegro, Metodije Ostoji\u0107, participated in the promotional activities of candidate Andrija Mandi\u0107. A few days before the first round of the elections, the SOC gave <\/a>its blessing to all those who are fighting against anomalies that are harmful to society and dangerous to the Church.<\/em> Before the second round, the SOC’s message was even clearer; \u0110ukanovi\u0107’s campaign was labelled as anti-church, the rhetoric as uncivilized, and the politics as quarrelsome and citizens were invited to confirm in the elections that this policy was overcome<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n

Media and social networks<\/mark><\/h2>\n\n\n

Considering the importance of the presidential elections in the circumstances of a deep political crisis and the specific socio-political circumstances in which they were held, the atmosphere during the election day itself in the first and the second round of the presidential elections was quite calm. Several minor incidents and irregularities were registered during the voting and recorded by CeMI. However, numerous fake news and disinformation published on regional portals and social networks marked the election cycle and the voting process.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\"\"<\/a><\/figure>\n\n\n

Media from Serbia<\/mark><\/h3>\n\n\n

As well as during the 2020 parliamentary elections and the 2021 local elections in Nik\u0161i\u0107, the media from Serbia led the way in reporting on the situation in Montenegro during the presidential elections. The headlines were often tendentious and tinged with sensationalism. In this way, an attempt was made to influence public opinion, and often to mislead the public in Montenegro. This is particularly worrying given the large readership of the Serbian media in Montenegro. The same narratives and predictions about the final outcome of the elections prevailed during the first and second rounds of the presidential elections. In the earlier election cycles, Serbian tabloids known to the general public were leading the way, while now marginal Serbian portals that are not very popular and that normally deal with Montenegro sporadically are in the foreground. The portals in question are Nacionalist, Vaseljenska TV,<\/em> and Na\u0161a Borba<\/em>, which published dozens of fake news during the two election rounds.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

During the first round of the presidential elections, the aforementioned portals published news about the alleged beating of the current mayor of Podgorica, Ivan Vukovi\u0107, by the president of the Democratic Party of Socialists, Milo \u0110ukanovi\u0107, trying to prove it with photographs that were evidently digitally modified. In addition, the same addresses spread in a coordinated manner the delusions regarding the former Montenegrin Minister of Defence Milica Pejanovi\u0107-\u0110uri\u0161i\u0107 and presidential candidate Draginja Vuksanovi\u0107-Stankovi\u0107, along with the fake news about the alleged police detention of several DPS activists in Nik\u0161i\u0107 for buying votes. During election day, on March 19, those portals synchronized to spread fake news that police had arrested Montenegrin businessman Ranko Ubovi\u0107 and that they have found alleged equipment for illegal wiretapping. The police department denied such allegations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The same portals continued their coordinated activities on the same matrix before and during the second round of the presidential election, spreading numerous fake news and disinformation that contradict the journalism codex and professionalism. During the second round of presidential elections, Nacionalist, Na\u0161a Borba, <\/em>and Vaseljenska TV<\/em> published about 70 fake news. They shared phone numbers of politicians, journalists, and civil sector representatives, claimed that Milo \u0110ukanovi\u0107 was preparing great harm to Montenegro, that there were technical problems on the flight from Luxembourg which caused panic at Podgorica Airport, that the car convoy was stoned near Pljevlja, etc. However, such announcements did not draw much public attention, because they were not broadcast by other media, nor were there significant reactions on social networks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Portal Nacionalist <\/em>does not have an impressum, while the Facebook page of that portal, which has been available under the same name since September 2, 2016, was once a page called \u0421\u043b\u043e\u0431\u043e\u0434\u0430 \u0437\u0430 \u0414\u0430\u0440\u043a\u0430 \u0428\u0430\u0440\u0438\u045b\u0430 (Freedom for Darko \u0160ari\u0107).<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Unlike the Nacionalist<\/em> portal, Vaseljenska<\/em> TV<\/em> and Na\u0161a Borba<\/em> portals have impressum. The impressum on Vaseljenska TV<\/em> portal states that the editor-in-chief Vesna Veizovi\u0107, who is in the database of the Ukrainian website Mirotvorec<\/em>, is part of the Center for the Study of Crimes against the National Security of Ukraine, where she is called an anti-Ukrainian propagandist. An analysis of Veizovi\u0107’s Facebook profile revealed that she was in Montenegro, specifically on the premises <\/a>of Srpska <\/em>RTV, in Podgorica, just before the first round of the presidential election. According to her Facebook post, it can also be concluded that Veizovi\u0107 is preparing video reports for Srpska <\/em>RTV, which she points out to be the only television with a Serbian narrative in Montenegro<\/em>. Serbian Radio Television is a new medium on the Montenegrin media scene, whose editor-in-chief is Serbian citizen Vladimir Dobrosavljevi\u0107, political analyst and former advisor of Andrija Mandi\u0107. The provider of audiovisual media services (AVM), i.e. the broadcaster of Srpska<\/em> RTV is the NGO \u0414\u0440\u0443\u0448\u0442\u0432\u043e \u0437\u0430 \u0440\u0430\u0432\u043d\u043e\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442 \u0438 \u0442\u043e\u043b\u0435\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0446\u0438\u0458\u0443 \u2013 \u0410\u0418<\/em>, whose founders are, among others: Marina Jo\u010di\u0107, former MP of the Democratic Front and director of TV Prva<\/em>, Ksenija Kljaji\u0107, sister of Andrija Mandi\u0107 and Mom\u010dilo Vuksanovi\u0107, president of the Serbian National Council.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The publisher of the portal is the Youth Development Movement of Serbia OPS, with headquarters in Novi Sad. The President of this movement is Branislav Petkovi\u0107, who is a member of Mi\u0161a Vaci\u0107’s Serbian Right.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Some media in Serbia also had special shows and columns dedicated to the elections, a practice that is repeated during every election cycle in Montenegro. Thus, on TV Happy<\/em>, on April 1, 2023, the day before the second round of the presidential election, a show called After Lunch \u2013 Elections in Montenegro<\/em> was broadcast with guests Perica \u0110akovi\u0107, journalist; \u017deljko \u010curovi\u0107, president of the Association of Serbs in Montenegro; Predrag Savi\u0107, lawyer and Vesko Dra\u0161kovi\u0107, president of the Association of Knez Miroslav. On that occasion, the presenter presented a series of incorrect information according to which the money for the needs of public funding, including the pension fund in Montenegro comes from the black funds of President \u0110ukanovi\u0107, completely ignoring the fact that public expenditure is financed from the budget in accordance with the law. She also created a narrative that the possible defeat of \u0110ukanovi\u0107 would lead to the cessation of black fund funding and the collapse of Montenegrin finances while spreading disinformation <\/a>that companies like Planta\u017ee have been shut down.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the days following the end of the second round of the presidential election and the announcement of the final election results, the Montenegrin elections and the socio-political situation in Montenegro after them continued to be the main topic in Serbian media. After the aforementioned portals ended their mission of spreading fake news after the closure of polling stations, what followed in the days to come was reporting of other Serbian portals and TVs tinged with narratives and sensationalism. After the victory of Jakov Milatovi\u0107 and the defeat of Milo \u0110ukanovi\u0107, one of the key questions in the Serbian media is the future of Montenegrin-Serbian relations. The dominant narrative is that the defeat of Milo \u0110ukanovi\u0107 opens the door to better relations between Serbia and Montenegro. Numerous articles, TV shows and analyst statements <\/a>emphasize that the relations between the two states have been locked up until now solely because of Milo \u0110ukanovi\u0107 and that he has been politically profiting from the politicization of Serbian-Montenegrin relations and the alleged malign influence of Belgrade and Moscow. In Serbia’s public discourse, expectations are that new president Jakov Milatovi\u0107 will turn to Belgrade and that relations will finally be better. Jakov Milatovi\u0107’s victory in the media is generally described as good news for Montenegro, but also for the region, as the<\/em> autocrat and dictator<\/em> Milo \u0110ukanovi\u0107 left power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Out of a total of 17,954<\/strong> media announcements that contained the keywords Montenegro and elections in the period 08.03 – 08.04. In 2023, the most announcements came from Montenegro (8,784<\/strong>), followed by Serbia (6,319<\/strong>) and BiH (1,717<\/strong>).<\/p>\n\n\n

Media from Montenegro<\/mark><\/h3>\n\n\n

Montenegrin media did not produce and spread fake news on a significant scale. Between the two rounds of elections, we did not register disinformation in the Montenegrin media, while in the run-up to the first round, there were several cases, namely: in connection with the conveying fake public opinion polls, the case of the stopwatch on RTCG <\/em>during the presidential debate, and the alleged news that an official of the Europe Now movement, Andrej Milovi\u0107 was carrying a gun on Cetinje. Nevertheless, the analysis revealed biased reporting, which is also a form of information manipulation that was used to try confuse and deceive the public, that is, the voters. This was probably influenced by the editorial policy of media controlled by the ownership structure, which in most media in Montenegro is foreign.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Agency for Electronic Media (AEM) has published a preliminary report <\/a>on media monitoring that accurately shows the representation of individual presidential candidates in the media. The survey confirmed the advantage and greater presence of a number of candidates in private electronic media. Monitoring was done before the first round of the presidential election and showed that the largest media space, with 34% of media coverage, had candidate Andrija Mandi\u0107. After the leader of the Democratic Front, Mandi\u0107, according to the report on media coverage, followed Jakov Milatovi\u0107 from the Europe Now movement, former president of Montenegro Milo \u0110ukanovi\u0107 and Aleksa Be\u010di\u0107 from the Democrats.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Digital Forensic Center conducted monitoring of presidential candidate posts on portals and Facebook to determine their representation, reporting tone, key topics in articles, as well as their reach and interactions on Facebook posts. In the period from March 1-14, DFC registered 1,363 posts (original and conveyed) mentioning candidates for the March 19 presidential election on six Montenegrin portals: Adria, Borba, CdM, IN4S, RTCG, <\/em>and Vijesti<\/em>. Monitoring showed that most posts were on the portals, with 776 being about presidential candidate Milo \u0110ukanovi\u0107, out of which 501 were negative, 141 neutral, and 134 positive. In second place in the number of publications and mentions in articles is presidential candidate Jakov Milatovi\u0107. Out of 480 articles, most were neutral \u2013 230, which is the most of all presidential candidates. There were 182 positive articles along with 68 negative ones. Presidential candidate Andrija Mandi\u0107 is ranked third in terms of representation on observed portals and first in terms of the number of positive articles. Out of a total of 357 articles, Mandi\u0107 was mentioned 219 times in a positive tone, 92 times in neutral, and 46 times in a negative context. A temporal correlation of posts on portals was also performed, i.e. a time overlap of positive and negative posts about candidates on portals. When it comes to positive articles about candidate Mandi\u0107, the highest degree of correlation was observed between the portals Borba<\/em> and IN4S<\/em> (0.83). On the other hand, in articles with a negative tone towards candidate \u0110ukanovi\u0107, the highest degree of content correlation was observed between the portals Vijesti\/RTCG<\/em> (0.88), IN4S\/Adria<\/em> (0.81), Borba\/Adria<\/em> (0.79) and RTCG\/IN4S<\/em> (0.78). In the run-up to the second round of the election<\/strong>, the trend of negative publications about presidential candidate Milo \u0110ukanovi\u0107 continued, with 371 negative publications out of a total of 610 publications dedicated to this candidate. There were 521 posts about presidential candidate Jakov Milatovi\u0107 on all six analyzed portals, and the majority, 267, were positive, 160 were neutral, and 94 negative posts, according to the monitoring of the portal conducted by DFC in the period from  March 20-28 , 2023.<\/p>\n\n\n

Social Networks<\/h3>\n\n\n

In addition to portals, a significant channel for spreading disinformation, fake news, and narratives during the presidential election were social networks, which are increasingly becoming a source of information for the media. The Digital Forensic Center registered accounts on Twitter and Facebook as sources of incorrect information, especially in the first round of the presidential election, when non-existent public opinion polls and announcements with arbitrary percentages of support for candidates were most often fabricated with the misuse of the name of some credible research agency as a source, and all with the aim of misleading the public. During this election cycle, fake polls were attributed to the Embassy of Germany in Montenegro and relevant agencies for public opinion polls: IPSOS, DAMAR, and CEMI. In addition to the fake and non-existent polls, anonymous profiles and accounts on social networks ran campaigns throughout the election cycle. Through their activities, they tried to discredit candidates who are not their favorites, insult and intimidate dissenters but also the diaspora and minorities, spread panic, and passivize the electorate. In the run-up to the second round, the target of disinformation was presidential candidate Jakov Milatovi\u0107. In the photo that appeared on social networks, you could read that Milatovi\u0107 pointed out in an interview for Blic<\/em> that he was on a first-name basis with \u0160e\u0161elj. However, in the aforementioned interview, he did not mention or comment on Vojislav \u0160e\u0161elj, as it was presented on the networks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

An example of disinformation was also registered by a political actor, Andrej Milovi\u0107, an official of the Europe Now movement, who on April 1 spread incorrect information on the procedure related to voting by letter on his Twitter account. Certain portals reported his announcement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

When it comes to social networks and their use by presidential candidates, DFC used official Facebook data to determine how much money the candidates spent on advertising on Facebook for the presidential election from February 19 to March 19, i.e. the first round of the presidential election<\/strong>. Presidential candidate Aleksa Be\u010di\u0107 spent the most money on advertising – 11,007 euros, while presidential candidate Milo \u0110ukanovi\u0107 spent 9,098 euros for the same purpose. The official page of Andrija Mandi\u0107 paid 9,047 euros for advertising on Facebook. In the days leading up to the second round (March 27, 2023 – April 2, 2023), CeMI determined <\/a>how much money the presidential candidates spent on advertising on Facebook. The analysis showed that the presidential candidate of the Europe Now movement, Jakov Milatovi\u0107 spent moderately more money on advertising – 1,154 euros, while the presidential candidate of DPS Milo \u0110ukanovi\u0107 spent 1,014 euros for the same purpose.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In addition to the official Facebook pages of the presidential candidates and their political parties, other Facebook pages and groups played a significant role in promoting party politics and propaganda. This comes as not a novelty, because even in previous election cycles DFC has recorded activities on social networks, specifically coordinated inauthentic behavior on Facebook. In its Report on preliminary findings and conclusions, CeMi stated that there was noticeable activity on 3 meme pages (Ne budite dio tog luda\u010dkog pokreta – 5,300 followers; Spla\u010dinijada 2022 – 7,710 followers; Neprijatni\/Unlimited Power\/Psalm 118 – 2,100 followers), which through their predominantly satirical content, ridiculed and created a negative image of certain candidates.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the run-up to the first round of the presidential elections, DFC observed the coordinated activity of Facebook pages that shared fake news about an alleged public opinion poll commissioned by the German Embassy in Montenegro in anticipation of the presidential elections. The fake news was published by the Serbian portal Glas javnosti<\/em>, the content was conveyed by the portal Borb<\/em>a, as well as several Facebook pages. The first of them, Nik\u0161i\u0107 ponosni srpski grad<\/em>, was up-to-date in the period of local elections in Nik\u0161i\u0107 in 2021 when it participated in coordinated <\/a>activities. From the mentioned page, the fake news about the survey was distributed in a coordinated manner to a large number of other addresses, from several of the same profiles. During the entire election cycle, DFC observed a large number of synchronized activities, that is, the sharing of links, posts, video content, and photos in a short period of time according to the same matrix.<\/p>\n\n\n

Conclusion<\/mark><\/h2>\n\n\n

Facing the upcoming extraordinary parliamentary elections, but also all subsequent elections, Montenegro must find a way to overcome and deal with the problems of institutional dysfunction, a disorganized electoral list, and an electoral legislative framework while establishing institutional capacities for monitoring and more decisively and timely countering foreign influences on the electoral processes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The lack of strong democratic institutions, as well as the lack of citizens’ trust in them, together with a high degree of social polarization and the passive approach of political leaders, has allowed the involvement of foreign actors in the electoral processes in Montenegro, which are in permanent conflict with the democratic, liberal and anti-fascist values on which the modern Montenegrin state is based.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Unlike some previous election cycles and the emergence of ad hoc<\/em> disposable portals for propaganda purposes (Udar, Jasno, 24hrs<\/em>, and others), this time the DFC team did not record the emergence of new media, but the reactivation of otherwise passive portals from abroad.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Competent authorities should take a serious approach to reduce the problem of disinformation in Montenegrin society. In this regard, a question of political will arises, since, despite the ban on broadcasting RT<\/em> and Sputnik<\/em> on the territory of Montenegro, it is possible to access their portals unhindered. The Government of Montenegro must assume a much more active role and responsibility in combating media manipulation, which implies educating the public, strengthening the freedom of the press, and affirming international cooperation. It must also invest in educating, empowering, and raising public awareness about disinformation in the media and on social networks while affirming the obligation to follow the Law on Media and formats that factually function as media but are not registered in the media register.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

It would be beneficial to establish more effective cooperation between the civil sector and state institutions, further ensuring the regularity of electoral processes and reducing the polarization that burdens Montenegrin society.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The second round of the presidential election, which was held for the first time in the last 20 years, resulted in the victory of one of the leaders of the Europe Now Movement and former Minister of Economy, Jakov Milatovi\u0107, over the long-term president of Montenegro and leader of the Democratic Party of Socialists, Milo […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":15331,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":true,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_seopress_robots_primary_cat":"none","_seopress_titles_title":"","_seopress_titles_desc":"","_seopress_robots_index":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[37],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-15366","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-our-work"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/dfc.me\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15366","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/dfc.me\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/dfc.me\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/dfc.me\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/dfc.me\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=15366"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/dfc.me\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15366\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":15373,"href":"https:\/\/dfc.me\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15366\/revisions\/15373"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/dfc.me\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/15331"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/dfc.me\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=15366"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/dfc.me\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=15366"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/dfc.me\/en\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=15366"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}