{"id":18209,"date":"2025-10-31T14:57:11","date_gmt":"2025-10-31T13:57:11","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/dfc.me\/?p=18209"},"modified":"2025-11-01T11:24:41","modified_gmt":"2025-11-01T10:24:41","slug":"when-disinformation-shapes-reality-media-and-political-echoes-of-the-zabjelo-incident","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/dfc.me\/en\/when-disinformation-shapes-reality-media-and-political-echoes-of-the-zabjelo-incident\/","title":{"rendered":"When disinformation shapes reality: Media and political echoes of the Zabjelo incident"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

In the Podgorica neighborhood of Zabjelo, on October 26, 2025, a physical altercation occurred between a group of local young men from Podgorica and, according to police reports, four nationals of Azerbaijan and Turkey. Cold weapons were used during the fight, and one Podgorica resident sustained a minor stab wound. The police arrested the Azerbaijani and Turkish nationals; however, the investigating judge of the High Court in Podgorica revoked their detention, ruling that there was no reasonable suspicion that the two had committed the criminal offense of attempted murder against the Podgorica resident.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This incident coincided with pre-existing tensions in Montenegrin society, fueled by narratives about Islamization<\/em>, the alleged influx and takeover by foreigners, and the politicization of migration and identity issues. These dynamics have led to acts of vandalism, violence, and hate speech. In this sense, the incident cannot be viewed merely as a criminal matter but rather as a reflection of deeper systemic weaknesses\u2014institutional, media-related, and political. If such phenomena are not addressed and prosecuted in an appropriate and just manner, Montenegro may witness renewed and even more destructive cycles of social polarization.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Zabjelo incident triggered a wave of protests framed as citizens\u2019 defense actions<\/em>. However, the background of these gatherings was clerical-nationalist in nature, as confirmed by the slogans heard during the rallies\u2014many of which were rife with hate speech and xenophobia. Political party statements, reporting by pro-Serbian media outlets in Montenegro, as well as Serbian regime-affiliated media, known for spreading disinformation and false narratives, all contributed to heightening tensions. These factors, compounded by the amplification of hate speech and disinformation on social media, have fueled the rise of clerical-nationalist activity within society. In Podgorica, Bar, and Herceg Novi, restaurants and vehicles owned by Turkish citizens were set on fire. Consequently, what began as an isolated security incident with elements of a criminal offense has evolved into a national\u2014and even regional\u2014security concern, marked by clear aspects of intimidation and collective retaliation against a specific group.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n

Visa Regime<\/strong><\/h1>\n\n\n

Faced with public pressure and an extraordinary security situation, the Government of Montenegro resorted to introducing visas for Turkish nationals. Prime Minister Milojko Spaji\u0107 announced the decision immediately after the outbreak of protests via social media, emphasizing that it would be adopted under an urgent procedure. At an extraordinary government session, the visa-free regime with Turkey was formally suspended until further notice \u2014 temporarily, according to the official explanation. The Government justified the measure on security grounds, citing the need to control the entry and stay of foreigners and to preserve public order, while noting that the visa regime for Turkish citizens would be temporary and that a fast-track visa issuance procedure would be introduced to mitigate the impact on the economy and tourism.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The decision carries three layers of consequences<\/strong>. The first is domestic political<\/strong>: the government demonstrates decisiveness but simultaneously risks normalizing the narrative that the Turkish community represents a security threat, opening the door to selective stigmatization and ethnic profiling.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The second is economic:<\/strong> Turkey is an important source of investment, real estate purchases, and seasonal spending, while Montenegro relies heavily on its image as an easily accessible Adriatic destination. Entry restrictions \u2014 even if formally temporary \u2014 pose a reputational risk that Montenegro is starting to close its doors, which could directly affect the tourist season and revenues in hospitality, air transport, and short-term rentals, especially if Turkey responds with reciprocal measures against Montenegrin citizens or if some potential visitors simply redirect their plans to other Mediterranean destinations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The third layer is foreign policy<\/strong>: the government also ties this decision to alignment with European standards, as the EU expects candidate countries to harmonize their visa policies with the Schengen list. In practice, this means that Montenegro would eventually have to introduce visas not only for Turkey but also for Russia before closing negotiation chapters. The government now presents this decision as a step toward meeting EU criteria, not merely a reaction to street pressure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, the key weakness<\/strong> of the measure is that introducing visas acts more as a political gesture toward the domestic audience than as a real solution to the problem being exploited to fuel tensions, the already present community of foreign nationals. Montenegro currently hosts several tens of thousands of foreigners with legal status, including, according to data from the Ministry of Interior, around 13,800<\/strong> Turkish citizens with temporary residence and 87<\/strong> with permanent residence, while there are even more Russian citizens \u2014 about 23,330<\/strong>. It is important to note that the actual number of foreigners is significantly higher than official MUP statistics suggest.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the case of Turkish nationals, the post-incident narrative was immediately criminalizing and ethnically charged (Turks attacking, Turks taking over Podgorica<\/em>). For Russian nationals, such an aggressive labeling campaign did not occur, even though their numbers are greater, suggesting that the security argument has not been applied consistently but rather selectively politicized. In other words, the visa regime may limit new inflows but does not address existing structural issues: weak migration control, the issuance of temporary residence permits through property purchases or fictitious companies, and the instrumentalization of foreigners in political and identity conflicts. This dynamic carries a long-term risk that certain migrant communities could become convenient internal scapegoats whenever the authorities need a quick and visible response \u2014 to the detriment of social cohesion and Montenegro\u2019s international relations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For that reason, alongside the introduction of visas, more comprehensive measures are needed to address the underlying issues:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n