Since the beginning of the Russian aggression on Ukraine in February 2022, almost all independent media in Russia have been banned, blocked, and/or declared as foreign agents or undesirable organizations. All others are subject to military censorship. Over the past decade, Russia has used the so-called Foreign Agents Law to label and punish critics of government policies.
The Russian malign influence is dominant in the region of the Western Balkans. One way in which Russian influence is manifested is the promotion of the Russian authoritarian system of governance. The president of the Republic of Srpska, Milorad Dodik, has on several occasions announced the introduction of the Foreign Agents Law in this Bosnian-Herzegovinian entity. The ruling structures in Serbia often target opposition media and the non-governmental sector as foreign mercenaries, while certain pro/Russian media and extreme right-wing structures in Montenegro identically target the NGO sector to create an atmosphere of fear and insecurity. Russian proxies in the region aim to further promote authoritarian values in the Western Balkans. Therefore, it is necessary to look closely at anti-democratic practices in Russia.
The Foreign Agents Law
The term foreign agent in Russia refers to an entity that, according to the Russian Government, receives support from aboard or is under foreign influence in some other way, engages in political activities in Russia, consciously gathers information about military-technical activities of the Russian Federation, or spreads messages and materials to an unlimited number of people.
The categories that can be recognized as foreign agents include: Russian or foreign legal entities, regardless of their organizational and legal form; public associations operating without establishing legal entities; individuals, regardless of their nationality, non-profit organizations, media platforms, and individual Russian citizens, including journalists and activists.
The authorities in Russia are preparing for the re-election of Vladimir Putin in 2024, and there will be increasingly less tolerance towards any discourse that opposes the official Kremlin narrative. Almost all independent media have already been eliminated in the country. Most independent journalists are forced to flee the country, and as a result of anti-media laws, journalists and other activists receive very harsh prison sentences (15 years in prison for spreading misinformation about the Russian armed forces). Not one journalist is protected from serious threats and charges under vaguely formulated, repressive laws that are often adopted overnight. Many laws related to freedom of expression, including defamation and fake news laws, that were adopted in recent years, have been amended to be included in the Criminal Code at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic. The invasion of Ukraine has given a new impetus to this process, with the Russian parliament adopting amendments that make false information about the Russian armed forces and any other Russian state body operating aboard punishable by imprisonment up to 15 years.
The initially adopted Foreign Agents Law in Russia in 2012 has been revised multiple times over the past decade as to include an increasing number of potential targets for state-supported discrimination. To date, more than 500 organizations, journalists, activists, artists, and other public figures have received that status. Currently, any organization, media outlet, or individual can be labeled as a foreign agent simply by the Russian Ministry of Justice declaring them to be under foreign influence or for receiving any amount of funds from abroad (or from entities that themselves receive foreign funds). According to the old version of the law, the prosecutor had to establish that a person accused of acting as a foreign agent must be receiving financial or material assistance from abroad.
Although foreign agents are technically not on the margins and are formally allowed to continue some activities in Russia, the legal burdens imposed on them in practice isolate them from society. Russian citizens who receive money from foreign agents can also be labeled as such, while media outlets and other groups employing them take on similar risks. Foreign agents must also undergo expensive and time-consuming audits of their funding and submit regular reports on their public activities.
The Public Prosecutor’s Office can now legally suspend any media platform (newspapers, radio, television, or website) or prevent its registration without invoking the court. According to the amendments adopted on June 30, 2023, suspension can take effect immediately and without prior notice, meaning that the media platform is not allowed to remove the controversial content to avoid this sanction. These amendments target publications that contain any information not in line with the government’s views, that do not respect the authorities, discredit the military forces or state organs, or call for demonstrations or sanctions, propaganda, and the promotion of extremism. In case of repeated violations – if it is determined that the media platform has published more than one instance of such content, extrajudicial suspension can last indefinitely. At the same time, foreign media can be closed as a retaliatory measure if they are registered in countries that have imposed restrictions on Russian media. Given that the Russian state television broadcaster RT is now banned in the European Union, it means that any European media outlet can now be targeted in Russia.
All independent privately-owned television channels are banned from broadcasting, except for cable entertainment channels. Many Western media, such as Euronews, France24, and BBC are no longer available in the country. The regulatory media body, Roskomnadzor, has blocked access to most independent media portals, including Meduza, the most-read portal, and Novaya Gazeta, the most popular print media. Those who survive for several years are either allies of the Kremlin or are forced into strict self-censorship due to prohibited topics and terms.
The radical sanctions imposed on Russia by the Western democracies in response to the invasion of Ukraine abruptly severed economic ties with Europe, with which the Russian economy was closely integrated. In addition to censorship – which has forced many media platforms to cease their activities and impoverished the remaining independent journalists, compelling them to change professions or go abroad – among the first victims of the economic crisis are also regional media.
Although the internet user rate is very high, almost two-thirds of Russians primarily get news through television, which is under government control, and through Russian social media, mainly via the Vkontakte platform (an insurance company linked to the Kremlin Sogaz, and Gazprom-Media have taken control of the VK social network in Russia). Topics such as homosexuality and religious orientation have gradually become forbidden for the media under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, who encourages conservatism in Russian society.
The Prosecution of Journalists
In addition to severe penalties and torture that some journalists have endured, mostly at the regional level, frequent fines and brief detentions under various pretexts have been added to the arsenal of systematic intimidation used against journalists in recent years. The media are also under the constant threat of arbitrary placement on the list of foreign agents and undesirable organizations, a status that comes with heavy bureaucratic obstacles and legal risks, criminalizing any mention or collaboration with targeted media. Facing additional risks they have endured since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, many journalists working for independent media platforms have chosen to leave the country.
Several hundred Russian journalists have left the country where reporting on topics directly or indirectly related to the war in Ukraine can lead them to imprisonment. Many of them have found refuge in neighboring Georgia, Baltic countries, or within the European Union, especially in Poland, Germany, and France. Despite this, the majority of these media organizations are trying to continue working remotely. This includes the journalists of the portal Bumaga, who continue to report on the St. Petersburg region from seven different countries.
Since the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, almost all independent media sources in Russia have been closed, forced to cease operations, or left the country to work from exile.
Meta has been declared an extremist organization and has been banned. Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, Russian authorities have blocked or restricted access to Facebook, Twitter (X), Instagram, and most other Western social media platforms. However, one platform remains – YouTube. Every Russian with internet access can go on YouTube and watch videos depicting Putin’s unlawful aggression, as shown by CNN, BBC, Ukrainian media, or even prosecuted supporters of the imprisoned Russian dissident Alexei Navalny.
As a reason for YouTube remaining in the good graces of the Russian regime, besides being the most popular platform even before the war, Minister of Digital Development Maskut Shadaev states that when restricting something, we must ensure that our users do not suffer. A ban is an extreme measure, possible only when we have competitive alternatives. Another likely reason why Putin treats YouTube differently is its significance in spreading propaganda and disinformation within Russian society, as well as the fact that it allows propaganda sources like RT and Sputnik News to reach millions of viewers in the West. According to the Skillfactory agency’s data from the beginning of 2023, 99 million Russians visit YouTube. 52.8% of the YouTube audience in Russia consists of women – the main voters of Vladimir Putin, according to official statistics. Russian users spend an average of 48 minutes per day on YouTube. Many of them are relatively young individuals between 25 and 34 years old, who are challenging to reach through traditional television propaganda (24.8%).
The Kremlin’s control over mass media in Russia, including online media, is almost absolute, and content related to war and other foreign news on popular Russian online platforms is generally in line with the messages from the state leadership. Propaganda and disinformation are key tools of the domestic and foreign policy of the Russian Federation authorities. The main role in spreading Russian propaganda and disinformation is played by individuals who refer to themselves as journalists and publicists but are, in reality, part of the Kremlin’s control system of falsehoods. They shape Russian public opinion, ensuring the maintenance of socio-political stability for the regime.
For years, and especially after the aggression in Ukraine, Russia has been building a system of government that applies extreme measures of control over citizens and contains all the elements of a police state. Control over all democratic processes, media, and social networks through the application of artificial intelligence systems indicates that Russia is far from being a defender of traditional values. However, it is indicative that Russian proxy actors in the Western Balkans specifically tie their narratives to the traditional values promoted by official Moscow, without a critical stance on the value system forming in modern Russia.